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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 24

1987-1988

NUMBER 2

BICENTENNIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY SYMPOSIUM
Introduction
MICHAL R. BELKNAP*

The noted constitutional historian Alfred Kelly once observed,
"[t]here is a fairly close relationship between the day-to-day
methodology of the judicial process and that of historical scholarship."' When a court determines a rule of law to be applied in a
case "through an examination of a stream of judicial precedent
.. it plays the role of historian."'2 Noting that "[t]he Constitution itself is a product of the nation's past," Charles A. Miller
adds that "the Supreme Court, as the accepted interpreter of the
Constitution, has become a public interpreter of American political history."3 Constitutional law scholar Mark Tushnet is well
aware of what the Court has done. Yet Tushnet, a man with historical training, 4 and who has written history himself, 5 recently
denounced "efforts to ground today's decisions in historians history," criticizing these as "fundamentally misguided because they
misunderstand the historical enterprise."'
* Professsor, California Western School of Law. B.A. 1965, U.C.L.A.; M.A. 1967,
Ph.D. 1973, University of Wisconsin, J.D. 1981, University of Texas.
1. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 121.
2. Id. at 121.
3. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 6 (1969).
4. He holds an M.A. in history from Yale.

5. See, e.g.,

THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY

LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST

SEGREGATED

1810-1860 (1981);

EDUCATION,

THE

NAACP's

1925-1950 (1987); DuBois and

Houston, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause,
74 J. Am. HIsT. (1987).
6. Tushnet, Should HistoriansAccept the Supreme Court's Invitation, 15

ORGANI-

AM. HISTORIANS NEWSL. 12 (1987). Contra, Powell, Rulesfor Originalists,73 VA.
L. REV 659, 659-61 (1987).
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As the comments of Tushnet, Miller, and Kelly reveal, there is
a close relationship between law and history. As they also suggest,
the nature of that relationship is debatable and the issue of what
it ought to be is a matter of considerable controversy. That is why
the California Western Law Review sponsored a symposium on
this subject 7 and is publishing in this issue the papers and comments presented there.
Two recent events make this examination of the relationship between law and history particularly timely. The first of these is the
1987 Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. The Bicentennial inspired "an abundance of new historical scholarship on
legal and constitutional themes, an academic complement to the
less cerebral festivals, marches, and celebrations . . . throughout
the nation." 8 The Bicentennial prompted lawyers and legal academics to join with professional historians in exploring the meaning of the Constitution and the impact it has had on life in the
United States during the two hundred years since the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787. 9 During 1987, it often seemed as if everyone
was talking and writing about the Constitution.'0 One important
consequence of the flood of scholarship and discussion unleashed
by the Bicentennial is "greater public consciousness of constitutional issues and legal process, including the historical dimensions
of both.""
Like the Constitution's two hundredth birthday, the provocative
remarks of the Attorney General of the United States, Edwin
Meese III, have served to focus attention on the relationship between law and history. In a controversial 1985 speech to the
American Bar Association, Meese called for what he characterized as a "jurisprudence of original intent."' 2 Since then the Attorney General has taken the position that by failing to adhere
strictly to the words of the Constitution and the intentions of those
who drafted its various articles and amendments, the Supreme
7. The symposium was held at the California Western School of Law on November
21, 1987.
8. Scheiber, Introduction: The Bicentennial and the Rediscovery of Constitutional

History, 74 J. AM. HIST. 667 (1987).
9. Of the seventeen contributors to the JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY'S special
Bicentennial symposium issue, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE, one (Staughton
Lynd of Northern Ohio Legal Services) is a practicing attorney and four (Mark Tushnet of
Georgetown, Martha Minow of Harvard, Hendrik Haertog of Wisconsin, and Harry N.
Scheiber of the University of California at Berkeley) are law school professors.
10.

See Introduction: The Judicial Power and the Constitution, 71

JIDICATURE

64

(1987).
I1. Scheiber, supra note 8, at 671.
12.

Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III before the American Bar Associ-

ation, Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1985).
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Court has exceeded its lawful authority. 13 Law professor H. Jefferson Powell insists that the Framers never intended for the history of the writing and ratification of the Constitution to control
interpretation of the document,' 4 and historian Harry Scheiber
has dismissed Meese's doctrine of original intent as nothing more
than "Reagan era neo-conservativism . . . formulated in terms

designed to wrap policies of minimalism for the civilian sector of
government in the mantle of constitutional imperatives."1 5
The Attorney General's views are, however, in line with those
expressed earlier by another noted legal historian, Raoul Berger.' 6
They also accord with the position taken by former United States
Court of Appeals Judge Robert Bork,17 whose unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court during the bicentennial summer intensified interest in the controversy over original intent.
"Whatever the merits of that doctrine, the debate over the federal
courts proper role has given a sharp new edge to public sensitivity
on matters relating to constitutional law and history." 1 8
Yet, as Professor Powell has observed, "[c]ontemporary discussion of the theory and methodology of constitutional interpretation
exhibits no general agreement on the proper role of history ....19
Over the years, in interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has exploited the muse of history in various ways and for a
variety of purposes. In the pages that follow, William Wiecek
surveys these in "Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme
Court and the Uses of History." 2 Gordon Morris Bakken,
Charles A. Lofgren, and Francis N. Stites offer additional perspectives on that subject in a series of spirited critiques of
Wiecek's lead article.2
C.M.A. McCauliff explores the Supreme Court's use of history
in her "Consitutional Jurisprudence and Natural Law: Comple13. Shaman, Interpreting the Constitution"The Supreme Court's Properand Historic Function, 71 JUDICATURE 80 (1987).
14. Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885

(1985).
15. Scheiber, supra note 8, at 671.
16. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-64 (1977).
17. For an expression of former Judge Bork's views, see Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971). For an expression of
similar views by another conservative Republican jurist, see Wallace, Interpretingthe Constitution: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 71 JUDICATURE 81 (1987). For a perceptive
analysis of the merits and demertits of the "interpretivist" approach to constitutional adjudication, see Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication 72 VA. L.
REV. 1237 (1986).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Scheiber, supra note 8, at 670.
Powell, supra note 14, at 885.
See pages 227-268 infra.
See pages 269-286 infra.
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mentary or Rival Modes of Discourse?" 22 , a penetrating comparative analysis of the jurisprudence of two justices who based their
opinions on history and two who grounded theirs in natural law.
McCauliff demonstrates that neither approach is inherently either
liberal nor conservative. History, she concludes, can be employed
to support legal conclusions that accord with any political point of
view.
That conclusion is perhaps not surprising, for as historian Paul
Murphy pointed out a number of years ago, "[h]istory to the legal
profession ...

has a peculiarly functional quality as an aspect of

legal advocacy." 23 In "Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils
of Historical Review, ' 24 Peter Irons acknowledges this fact. He
goes on to argue, however, that historical scholarship is itself a
form of advocacy. Irons disagrees with those, such as Tushnet, 25
who contend that historians should confine themselves to educating judges and the public and should not attempt to contribute
directly to contemporary litigation. While "troubled about the
fuzzy line between scholarship and advocacy, ' 26 he knows that
historical research can be used to right old legal wrongs; he has
employed it for that purpose himself. In his article, Irons discusses
his successful efforts to get federal courts to set aside convictions
arising out of the forced relocation of Americans of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast during World War Two. For him,
history is a source of evidence that a skillful advocate can exploit
to win a case. For interpretivist justices it is a lode of arguments
they can mine to support a particular interpretation of the
Constitution.
Michael Griffith and Chet Orloff view the relationship between
law and history quite differently than Irons. Their concern is with
collecting and preserving the historical materials (printed works,
manuscripts, artifacts, oral histories, paintings and photographs)
that reveal the development of our judicial institutions. Griffith,
who is the archivist for the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, and Orloff, who serves as the executive director of the new Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, are part of a rapidly expanding effort to safeguard and make
accessible to attorneys, scholars, and the general public the materials that document the history of American law. As they point out
22.

See pages 287-335 infra.

23. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional
History, 69 AM. HIsT. REV. 64, 77 (1963).
24. See pages 337-354 infra.
25. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 12-13.
26. Irons, Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils of HistoricalReview, 24 CAL
W.L. REV. 337 (1988).
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in "Historical Societies and Legal History,"27 inrecent years numerous state and federal courts have set up organizations that are
working in diverse ways to ensure the survival of our judicial heritage and to increase awareness of the contributions to the development of the United States made by lawyers and judges.
Orloff and Griffith view the relationship between law and history as a relatively simple one; for them the function of history is
simply to record what law and legal institutions have done in the
past. The other contributors to this symposium see the relationship
as more complex. They picture two disciplines that are alike in
many respects yet significantly different in others, interacting in
an extremely complex way with one another. Their articles and
comments may lead some readers to conclude that this interaction
has had coercive effects on both law and history. Yet the contributions to this symposium issue also indicate that, like an affair the
paramours cannot bear to end despite the pain it causes them, the
relationship is an amazingly durable one. The following pages offer convincing evidence of both the persistence and the importance
of the controversial and often stormy association between law and
history.

27.

See pages 335-361 infra.
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